The Fall, From King to Peasant

In the final chapter of Albert Camus' The Fall, Jean-Baptiste begins to narrate his life during World War II. He spoke very fondly of his career and how humbly he lived in Paris. He talked of his life lived in debauchery whilst in his crisis, and now he finds himself speaking about the remaining time in Amsterdam, or “the circles of hell”.

While Jean-Baptiste was captured and held captive by the Germans in Africa, he met a man by whom he referred to as Du Guesclin. Du Guesclin lost his faith in the Catholic Church, but still believed there should be a pope. Not the type of pope who prayed on the throne, but lived among the wretched (125). In order to find this new pope the man who was chosen had to be of the most failings (125). “As a joke, I raised my hand and was the only one to do so... the others agreed, in fun, but with a trace of seriousness all the same” (125). This reference reestablishes that even though Jean-Baptiste thought it might be a joke, it turns out his past really proves him to be the one with the most failings. His life's plan had all but failed therefore he should remain the pope.

In the next interesting piece of the final chapter, Jean-Baptiste declares to his guest that he has in his possession a famous fifteenth century painting known as The Just Judges. He goes about telling the man how he came into possession of it, and though he had not been the one to steal it, he still felt as if the blame should land on him. The Just Judges is his method of explaining how he is a “judge-penitent”. Jean-Baptiste's argument comes down to how there is a hope of finding freedom. A freedom that may be found only if one gives up oneself to something greater than their own (132). Jean-Baptiste believes that his work is to teach others such as his guest and those who come to Mexico City that their freedom would be reach if they met their unconditional guilt.

In the end, Jean-Baptiste wishes only to replay what has happened in the past (147). He would like for nothing more than to jump in after the girl knowing it would be too late. His ending has a unique exclamation; he feels as though being too late is fortunate. Perhaps he feels this way because his misery and suffering would not exist if he ceased to live. 

A Social Realization in a Philosophical Solipsism

The chapter begins as Jean-Baptiste wishes to speak further with the reader regarding his affairs in Amsterdam. The narrator recalls the beauty of his Greek vacation while sailing the foggy Zuiderzee. The sea represents a constitutive experience. The thick fog of the sea juxtaposed with an island vacation presents a stark contrast. He remembers men holding hands in public while women remained indoors. Such an open display of affection shifts his attention towards his experiences with women. Jean-Baptiste yearns to reenter such an existence but his experiences with men have remained professional. He then seeks refuge among women. One of these women whom he calls a “parrot” threatened to starve herself. He soon lost all passion for the music he once loved. He makes a vow of chastity.

Jean-Baptiste soon finds himself caught up in a debaucherous orgy. Once a forbidden fruit, sex becomes a hedonistic refuge. He is driven by an insatiable desire he believes will lead him towards true happiness. Jean-Baptiste enters a thirty year self-engagement following what seems to have been a perpetual failure. He writes “Alcohol and women provided me, I admit, the only solace of which I was worthy. I’ll reveal this secret to you, cher ami, don’t fear to make use of it. Then you’ll see that true debauchery is liberating because it creates no obligations. In it you possess only yourself; hence it remains the favorite pastime of the great lovers of their own person.” (103) Jean-Baptiste’s alter ego sees happiness as the road to freedom. Once his narcissistic personality clashes with that of his lover his happiness quickly turns into feelings of betrayal and jealousy. These moments of self-judgment and detachment have only led to months of hedonistic orgies. There is no redeemable end in sight. Jean-Baptiste turns his attention away from his failed love life.

Jean-Baptiste searches his own mind for anything that might have given him an existential experience. At work he is resigned to boring tasks. There is yet another incident when he was plagued with indecision. He remembers ignoring a black speck in the water during a trip. He wonders whether this resignation has withdrawn him into a period of confinement. It is a rather absurd notion to suggest a man who is not guilty is struggling between innocence and judgment. He believes one might compare this to being spit on the face in a medieval oubliette awaiting justice. This is an awfully strange comparison. Jean-Baptiste has a tendency to blame man for the sins of mankind simply because there is no clear distinction between guilt or innocence. It is a commonly held belief that divine power passes judgment. Therefore, by acting as a judge-penitent Jean-Baptiste has assumed the role of God.

Religion plays a critical role in the solipsistic philosophy of Jean-Baptiste. He is well-versed in scriptures. Jean-Baptiste draws parallels between the Slaughter of the Innocents and post-WWII sentiments. He believes the Synoptic Gospels clearly demonstrate the importance of self-judgment by using a first-hand account of the life of Christ. The Confession of Peter refers to an episode in the New Testament where Peter proclaims Jesus Christ the messiah and Son of God. The Fall is essentially a long confession in which Jean-Baptiste proclaims himself judge-penitent. He does not mention whether God is the one dictating his philosophy on life. Jean-Baptiste maintains the continuity of his existence relies on his ability to cope with such parallels. Which leads us to wonder: Does Jean-Baptiste take the role of judge-penitent because he would gain more freedom of thought or does he desire to detach himself from reality as he has in the past?

A Night On The Seine

In The Fall, Camus writes an important passage that takes place along the River Seine and though open to interpretation, needs further clarification. The passage in the novel highlights issues of morality, guilt, complicity, and a particular view of what it means to be human which are all major themes of the novel itself.

Jean-Baptiste, after leaving a mistress, walks home in the middle of a November night (The Fall 69). He steps onto the Pont Royal, making his way to the Left Bank and in the process he notices a youthful woman dressed in black leaning upon the bridge railings. He walks on past her and hears the sound of the woman falling into the river waters and screaming as she floats downstream. The sounds of the screaming girl resonate with him until all he hears is an “interminable” silence (70). Though he stops at the sounds he does not turn around and after the silence he states, 

           “I wanted to run…yet…didn’t. I told myself I had to be quick…(then) an irresistible weakness steal over me" (70).                   

After this he forgets what he thought next and makes his way home to Blvd St. Michel and informed no one of the incident (70).

Jean-Baptiste, our modern day John the Baptist, has a chance to literally save the woman from a possible drowning. Interpretively he has a chance to be her savior and bring her out of the waters that she was plunged into. But Jean-Baptiste does not budge a muscle, instead his struggle is one of the mind. He wants to run; yet it seems not to the girl but rather away, underscoring a sense of guilt and shame. He trembles and has the thought of what to do, of what would be morally “right” but then has perhaps a moment of akrasia.

Finally the “irresistible weakness” overtakes him, but why a weakness? If you did not have a moral sense of right would it still be considered a “weakness”? The fact that in the aftermath he decides not to look over the newspapers for a few days may be a clue to his lingering guilt over the incident. For although there is no law that says he must save her and though he did not kill or harm her, he did nothing either to help prevent it.

In one brief instant Jean-Baptiste considers the morality of the situation, he experiences guilt, and in his decision he displays a sense of complicity. He had a choice in the matter and displayed an array of self-interruption dealing with that choice.  In that very instant Jean-Baptiste Clamence defined what it is to be human.

Hurray for Funerals

            In Camus’ The Fall, Clamence believes that people are compelled to behave in certain ways to fill the void left by a lack of excitement; essentially as a response to boredom.  These behaviors may be expressed by crimes, or through abuses of others, or even in very benign acts, like death, which are no one’s fault, exactly.  However, we are all to blame somewhat for our ravenous need for such events to occur around us.  He says towards the end of the chapter: “Something must happen- and that explains most human commitments.  Something must happen, even loveless slavery, even war or death” (The Fall 37). 

            He goes on throughout his conversation with a fellow bar patron to discuss his profession as a judge-penitent.  He appears to have an almost fanatical need to help people that he satisfies professionally by assisting widows and orphans to receive proper care by law (17).  However, he also expresses a need to help the elderly or blind cross the street- among a multitude of other behaviors- that he seems to perform compulsively (21).  Clamence seems very confident in his good deeds for others, both professionally and recreationally.  He also repeatedly mentions how satisfied he feels having found such a fulfilling vocation, knowing that he is really changing people’s lives for the better, yet it seems that he spends every night in the bar where his story begins, describing gin as the only comfort he has in the dark city (12).  He looks to other people both as ants, which he can only look down on from above, and as silhouettes dreamily walking through life (14). He even describes his position in the justice system as one where he does not need to be punished or punish others, so he remains in a position of power, untouched (27).  He seems to want to believe he loves helping people as much as he claims, yet it may be just something to fill the void just like all other events in life.

            Clamence explains that after living a life where he is constantly stimulated, the only thing that can excite him anymore is death.  He believes that when being notified of an acquaintance’s death, although one is momentarily saddened, there is more of an excitement awakened in them.  This death, and the presence of a funeral create drama and a narrative in the monotony of their life.  There is somewhere to go, a prospect that is hardly ever ignored.  Even if the recently deceased was not important to them, they still must visit, to witness the event (34).

            He describes funerals and death as those things that satisfy people’s cravings; things which need to happen in life in order to keep people living, otherwise people need to create an event, be it war or slavery, or the beating of their spouse (37).  Why is it that a simple life cannot suffice in any culture in any time?  Clearly, the repetition of those three examples Clamence gives exist time and time again, so why is it that we must create excitement where boredom exists, even when it seems to perpetuate more pain?

Self-Interpreting Animals?

Charles Taylor defines man as a “self-interpreting animal”, a being who exists only in self-interpretation, who comes to know itself, bringing all of its knowledge to its self, meaning, humans are subjects of experience. What we learn or know of objects is because of our experience with it, and describe them as such, which he calls the subjective nature and or properties. He states to understand the term, self-interpreting animal, we must also look at it from another side, which “requires that we think of it objectively, that is, as an object among other objects” (Taylor, 46). The objects are separate from our conceptions of it, properties it has without our conceptions of it, and are not dependant upon things.

Taylor further distinguishes objects and subjects into primary and secondary qualities in which he associates primary qualities with objects that are extensions or substances that belong to the thing itself, but separate from our relationship to it. Secondary qualities, which are subjective, are things like colors or qualities that we use as a result of an encounter we had with it, and are only concerned with our experience with that particular object. The set qualities are what further help us to understand our memory of the object.

            He understands the counterargument to his claim of judgments about our experience to an object and therefore is unable to reduce judgments to what we perceive an object to be. There will be experiences that we cannot attribute to anything else, but only to our experience of the thing, in such a case when we are dealing with emotions and feelings. He speaks of a “nameless fear” and “unfocused anxiety” where there is no object of reference (48). It is not the matter of there not being an object to reference but rather that an object is not needed for the direct cause of the emotion. Also our experience with an object may not reciprocate a similar response the second or third time of being in contact with it. His example of the water that feels cold now may feel warm later (46).

            Everyone’s experience of an object will be different because different people see things certain ways, so is it safe to say that humans are self-interpreting when we view things as we know them for the moment and not for a lifetime? As time goes by so does our memory of an object until it is brought back and viewed again. 

Is Man Self-Interpreting?

        

Charles Taylor argues that man is a self-interpreting animal. In order to understand this, he states that we have look at it from two points of views, objectively and subjectively. The objective view is seen “as an object among other objects” and the subjective is describing their properties according to our experience of them (Humans, 46). He says that one who is independent of such experiences would not be able to grasp why our senses such as sight enables us to see things in color (46). This is because as human beings, we can see the properties of certain objects through our experience of them and through repetition. Taylor creates a fable, where humans communicates with gaseous clouds called Alpha Centaurans and that it is possible for us to come to agreement with them, but they lack what we have which we know as “sense organs” (46). 

         It is through our experience and the interpretation of ourselves that makes us who we are and therefore cannot be seen as just a view on reality. When we experience thing with emotions or with desire as Taylor calls “experienced motivation,” we make judgments about the objects they are directed towards (47). These emotions allow us to be aware of certain situations and it gives us a better understanding of it. He says “Describing properly what these emotions are like involves making explicit the sense of the situation… gives the emotion its character” (48). This helps us to understand the meaning of such emotions and their properties. 

         Taylor describes this as an “import” and that it is related to certain aspirations or feelings (48). An import can stimulate emotions like fear or shame. In some cases, one is able to recognize the judgment or “import ascriptions” that one makes on a certain situation, even if it doesn’t correspond with the import. He uses an example of feeling ashamed even when he thought that there was nothing to be ashamed of (50). The imports are dependent on experience, so this would be impossible for Alpha Centaurans to understand because they see us from an objective view point. Taylor then uses himself as an example and that his effeminate voice and hands lacks masculinity and lowers his dignity, since he aspires to be respected among other men (53). The meanings of such emotions are only taken into account by those who are affected by it most, whereas it wouldn’t make sense to those that aren’t. 

         In contrast he describes the properties of physically menacing and that they are independent from experience, so that any living animal that lacked sense would understand the meaning of it (54). The Alpha Centaurans wouldn’t get why humans feel shame or humiliation, but they would understand the meaning of something dangerous or menacing. 

The Distinction Between Impressions and Ideas

                Within “An Abstract of a Book Lately Published; Entituled, A Treatise of Human Nature” the author seeks to make clarifications concerning topics presented in David Hume’s aforementioned text. The initial statement he wishes to examine concerns the source of all our “ideas, or weak perceptions” (6).  Hume wishes to create this distinction between the different types of perceptions as he believes that other philosophers have failed to do so. To accomplish this task, a distinction between ideas and impressions is necessary. Hume claims that all ideas originate from our impressions; or feelings of emotion and passion or the interpretation of external objects through the senses (5). Therefore, these impressions which are based upon feelings are strong perceptions that form the building block of thought and experience. In comparison, ideas are merely copies of these impressions as a result of thinking. Ideas are then the weaker of the two concepts presented. He continues to say that these impressions inevitably precede all ideas within the mind as they are the stronger of the two concepts (7). For example, the idea of a book derives from our initial impression of the object. Therefore the idea of the book cannot exist without this first impression as it is simply a copy.

                The author continues to delve into Hume’s definition of impressions more thoroughly throughout the text. For example, he states that on the occasion an idea is called to mind but is shrouded in ambiguity; the impression may provide a “clear and precise” (6) explanation. So, if all ideas are based upon impression and those that are even culled from the imagination originate from the source; then all ideas are reducible to things we have perceived through direct experience (6). Even if the mind has conjured an image that appears abstract and difficult to understand, we may ultimately return to the impression for understanding. As the author of the abstract summarizes, “All our ideas…are derived from our impressions, and we can never think of anything we have not seen...” (5). These definitions further exemplify that impressions provide greater clarity and ideas can only be weaker copies of these impressions.

                The author clarifies Hume’s reasoning for introducing this differentiation and applies the concepts of impressions and ideas to philosophical terms. He states that when an idea is not attached to the term, then it begs the question of what impression the idea is based off of. If these connections cannot be made, the philosophical term is then deemed “insignificant” (6). Through this passage it is apparent that Hume believes that in order for philosophical words to carry weight, they must initially arise from these ideas or copies of impressions. This is integral since it seems that Hume would dismiss any philosophical debate that is not grounded in this concept.  

Conscious Experience: Subjective vs. Objective

In Thomas Nagel’s “What Is It Like To Be a Bat?”, he states that for one to be aware of  conscious experience, one must know the difference between two types of conception, subjective and objective. Nagel says that for an animal to have conscious experience at all means that there is something that is like to be that animal (“Bat” 1). Not only is being that animal enough, but also what the experience is like for the animal itself. This is known as the subjective character of experience (“Bat” 1).

When one tries to comprehend another species experience they are only using one point of view, which is usually what they imagine the animal would feel or be like in that experience. However simply imagining the behaviors that a certain species does, doesn’t necessarily mean that you know what it is really like to be that animal and the experience they face. Nagel says, “…every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view” (“Bat” 2). For a human to truly understand another species experience, they need to stop imagining what it would be like for them if they were in a situation and focus on what it is like for the actual animal going through it. To clearly show this Nagel uses the example of a bat. He says that if a human really wants to understand what it is like to be a bat, they must stop thinking what would it be like if they were a bat, but instead focus on what it is like for a bat to be a bat. This is how the objective view comes into play because we would have difficulty understanding another species’ experiences without taking up their point of view. Nagel says that even though species have different point of views, certain concepts can still be apprehended because even though we comprehend things differently, we can still get some basic idea of the experience if we shift from using properties only known to human senses and expanding beyond that  (“Bat” 5). He says, “The less it depends on a specifically human viewpoint, the more objective is our description (“Bat” 5). And if humans were to use a more objective approach they would understand more what is it is like to be another species, and not just them as another species.

However do you think it is possible to truly get an objective point of view on an experience for another species, if there is no similarity between the two species at all?

Differences in perceptions among organisms and individuals

                In Thomas Nagel’s essay “What is it like to be a bat?” he thinks that every living thing is unique to something about that living thing, and there’s no way that we can get feel or experience of what that particular living thing experiences.  To prove this he used the example of a bat.  A bat use sounds to perceive their surroundings where a human who use eyesight can never experience of how a bat experiences. 

                The essay starts with the theme of “Consciousness,” where the author believes is what makes organisms so unique.  Consciousness, being the interaction of the mind and body makes up the complications for others to comprehend the feelings or experiences of things.  He says “I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. … I am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task.”  The author wants to experience what is it like for a bat with wings and hangs upside down, to be a bat.  Despite how the author tries imagines what a bat experiences, he is unable to do so.  As human beings, our resources [our mind and body] are so limited and uniquely attached to ourselves only.  Given only these resources the author can’t experience what a bat experiences as our body are entirely different from what a bat has. 

                Consciousness is also unique among different organisms of the same species.  The author made a reference to a blind and deaf child.  He claims that the subjective character is not known to him.  The subjective character means the perception of the world around the character.  In the case of a blind and deaf child, the author simply cannot conceive the experience that the child conceives because he is different from the child as he is not blind or death.  The child however, can describe the experience of blind and deaf to the author, but the author would have a different perception of what it’s like due to the difference in subjective character.

                With consciousness unique to the body and the mind, the author believes that it is impossible to perceive how another being or organism perceives it.  My question is, given universal truths like 2+2=4, does the consciousness also differ from how different individuals’ own perception of how 2+2 is 4?

Am I really typing this?

Descartes, in his six meditation, examines the existence of corporeal things insofar as he is a thinking thing and his body is an extended thing. In order to prove the existence of material things, the mind seem to be of use through the imagination. For, in one's mind, a triangle must exist because of its arithmetic properties such as it has three sides but also through the imagination which seems to give a triangle the appearance of truly existing. For one can imagine the lines connecting the three angles and the space in between them.

However, when thinking of a chiliagon (a thousand side figure) one can not imagine the figure but simply understand it logically. Hence, Descartes is "aware that [he] is in need of a peculiar sort of effort on the part of the mind in order to imagine, one that [he] does not imply in order to understand" (p. 48). Meaning, that one does not need the imagination in order to understand external bodies for his logical mind can define them as existent through mathematics.

Therefore, it could be deduced that the imagination is part of the body, for it's images come from external corporeal. However, although one could live without the imagination and the body, one still feel “particular” sensations (i.e size of the sun) or “less clearly understood” thoughts (i.e hunger or thirst) but they still may be false. However, “by means of these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, nature also teaches not merely that I am present to my body in the way a sailor is present in a ship, but that I am most tightly joined and, so to speak, commingled with it, so much so that I and the body constitute one single thing” (pg 53). The evidence of the mind feeling bodily sensations indicate that the two are tightly related and must both therefore exist as a single thing.

Nevertheless, although body and mind are closely related they are each an independent thing of one another. It is evident through the fact that the mind could not be divided into parts while a corporeal thing can (even in the imagination). If a limb is taken off our body the mind does not alter and therefore is independent from the body. The second observation regards this idea of separation between body and mind, is that sensation occurs in the nerves and brain but only turn into action after logic is applied to them. The sensation of pain is not enough in order to stop it from happening. Instead, Descartes believes that the sensation of pain “provokes the mind to do its utmost to move away from the cause of the pain, since it is seen as harmful” (pg 57). Hence, considering that one is only a thinking thing, one still has a body. It is separated from the mind by its being a non-thinking thing while the mind (and oneself) is the source of our thoughts.

Prospect of Error vs The Faculty of Knowing and Faculty of Choosing

Descartes explains the prospect of error. Descartes thinks that how can he ever erred if he was created by a Supreme Being which whom he is referring to God, because God could never make any mistakes. Descartes states that “for error is not a pure negation but rather a privation or a lack of some knowledge that somehow ought to be in. Descartes then questions himself and almost questioning God’s creation saying “God’s always wills what is best. Is it then better that I should be in error rather than not? Mediations,37). Descartes seems a little confused and seems like he is questioning God’s creation of the human mind but then he comes up with two causes of why these errors might occur (1) knowing and (2) choosing.

Error only occurs only of the will and the intellect. According to Descartes no error is found in the intellect. If you know something and can perform what you know then there shouldn’t be any error. Descartes says “through the intellect alone I merely perceive ideas…I can render a judgment” (Meditations 38).  The next cause is the choosing which he refers to as your will, in its judgments, going beyond what the intellect clearly and distinctly perceives to be the case. Willing is being able to do or not do the same thing. So God gives him the intellect which there can possibly be no errors but on his own free will their can be errors? Descartes is basically saying only on knowing you can make a judgment but on will there are going to be errors because this process of free will was came upon on his own and not from God.

Intellect is given by God so it cannot produce any kind of error, its impossible, according to Descartes stating, he makes it ultimately clear when he states  “I got my power of understanding from God, whatever I understand I doubtless understand rightly, and it is impossible for me to be deceived in this “ (Meditations,39). So my concern to Descartes theory on error is if the evidence is in your sight that your intellect has deceived you, what you actually thought was true has now became not true what do you believe? Do you still believe that your intellect is by far true just because the Supreme Being has created you and they are not in right to make mistakes?

           

The Creations of God vs. The Creations of Man

          Descartes states that inventions made by the hands of god are far more amazing than anything created by man (Meditations 31). Prior to this, he proves that the spread of animal spirits is necessary within human muscles for internal passions like hunger to occur, without the control of will. Whereas, a machine made by man would not have so many movements within itself as does the internal functions of the human body. There are two ways that we can tell distinctly from a man and a machine that imitates and looks like a man (Meditations 32). That is, the difference in speech and the placement of their organs limiting their actions. Even the supreme of all idiots can re-arrange their words in multiple ways to express what is on their mind. As long as we recognize the two methods of differentiating man and robot we can't go wrong, "And we should not confuse words with the natural movements that attest to the passions... by animals" (Meditations 33).
           Say if one were to come across a mechanical robot that resembles all of the features of a human body, how would one be able to tell the difference if it were the real thing or not? Descartes explains that the machine does not respond with reason behind its words but that it utters words that fit into its actions. Using these two methods, one can also tell the difference between man and beast as well as animals (Meditations 32). Although they do have the same internal organs as human beings, they are still incapable to think of what they are saying. This is not simple because they have less reasoning than humans, but that they have no sense of reasoning at all (Meditations 32).
           Maybe a certain animal possesses a skill that is superior in one action than human beings, but that doesn't mean that they are smarter. Human beings excel in far more areas than any animal or machine can do. Descartes uses a clock as an example and says a man couldn't keep track of time, even with all of his patience and accuracy, better than a clock made up of wheels and springs, which was invented by man to do so (Meditations 33). This is because the placement of its organs only allows it to move in that manner and it isn't made up of nearly as much organs to make it act in such a way that is identical to humans, where reason is the basis of all actions (Meditations 32).
           After that, Descartes then says that when the difference between the soul of man and those of a beast is well understood, one can infer that the human soul is separate from the body and that it is immortal, whereas the body is not. One can only come to this conclusion, until he/she is fully accustomed to the existence of God. This makes sense because Descartes is concluding that if the human soul is separate from the body and therefore, is immortal, then a man made machine that resembles a human body doesn't have a soul and so it is mortal. In other words this is why the creations of God is superior to the creations of man, "I described the rational soul and showed that it can in no way be derived from the potentiality of matter" (Meditations 33).

Did I Post This?

            Descartes believes that all things can be doubted.  Each thing does not need to be questioned specifically, because all things are built from certain presuppositions that are uncertain (Meditations 13-14).   The first of these is the senses, which have faltered in the past and so cannot be certain in the present: “it is a mark of prudence never to put our complete trust in those who have deceived us even once” (Meditations 14).  Even when the senses seem to be perceiving an obvious truth, they are not proof of anything because those “truths” appear just as obvious when we dream (Meditations 14).  From here Descartes reasons that imaginary things are based in reality: they are built from the same universal truths.  Imagination is simply an imitation of reality; therefore, though corporeal objects that we come to know from the senses may be false, the simple things such as mathematics, which is unconcerned with the existence of the corporeal is not proven false by the weakness of the senses (Meditations 14-15).  However, that such things cannot be doubted by doubting the senses is not enough to make them certain.  It is possible that a malicious God has deceived us into believing that a square has four sides.  People falter in things they believe they know perfectly, so why not in this too (Meditations 15-16)?  Therefore, by this method, all things and even their forms are put into doubt.

            By doubt, Descartes means treating as false all that is not absolutely proven true.  This is not a courtroom in which a thing is proven if it is beyond “reasonable doubt.”  The smallest doubt is as much reason for rejection as the largest (Meditations 13).  In the case of doubting mathematics, we see Descartes go so far as to doubt that objective and permanent things such as “three” or “square can be known by our reason (Meditations 15).  This in particular is what leads Descartes to the realization that everything can and must be doubted.

            Doubting mathematics and similar things only by means of doubting our own abilities to perceive truth brings up a question.  Though Descartes doubts our abilities, he never doubts the permanence of the simple things.  What if the idea of a square is called into question?  Descartes notes that he may be wrong that a square has four sides because he has miscounted, but what if a square is sometimes four sided and other times six?  Does this change any of Descartes later conclusions on his own existence?

Free to Be You and Me ♥ (in accordance with the true word of God)

In the preface to his Treatise on Theology and Politics, Spinoza describes his desire to give his readers a way to interpret the sacred books in order to pick out the word of God and the natural knowledge revealed by it while ignoring the messages that were implanted in order to promote obedience. He thinks that the key to a free State is the ability of its members to assent to whatever beliefs they want as long as their actions reflect obedience only to God's desire for his followers to be just and kind, rather than being forced to adhere to a flawed doctrine of beliefs (Treatise, 7).

His first justification for this position is, as Sol described, that people resort to superstitions only when unusual things happen. Whether good or bad, events that trigger superstition are fleeting and therefore must be made of "affects" rather than reason because reason is constant (Treatise, 2). If reason is constant, the true Scripture and word of God actually are rooted in reason (Treatise, 6), superstition has no reason, and it was the cornerstone of the Church's teachings, we can infer that since each political leader points to a different supposed godly truth to attain the obedience of his people, they must all be doing so under the guise of something other than the true word of God, which is completely rooted in love, in order to keep their people afraid and basically subservient. True dedication to God's word would grant spiritual sovereignty to the body of people who followed it. Additionally, by heeding the clergy as upstanding citizens and rewarding them for this behavior with money it opened the doors for greedy people to make their move into the Church for less than admirable reasons. Corruption in the Church lead to public displays of excess which then overshadowed any resolve to reiterate the true word of God (Treatise, 4).

Leading a State with the Church's fundamentally flawed doctrines built into its infrastructure will, then, lead to a fundamentally flawed state. Instead, a State should be governed with the natural rights of its individuals in mind because they are the ones who give the State power when they hand over their obedience. At first glance these points seem to be contradictory- Spinoza first talks about freedom and natural rights and then adds that if a person gives his power of defending himself to someone else that he hands these rights over to them. (Treatise, 8) What he means by this is that if a person who is granted freedom of mind willfully hands over this power to defend himself, he would only be doing so to a State that reflects his own beliefs. If a just person hands over his power to a State we can assume that the State is also just and will behave in accordance with at least the fundamentals behind the word of God and act in the best interest of its people.

Does this last point follow? Will just individuals only hand over their power to a governing body that is just or would they sacrifice their ideals for the protection that would come with a militant State? Does this then mean that they weren't just in the first place?

Superstition: A Need for Control

Spinoza thinks that superstition is irrational; he believes that it is people’s fear and constant need to be in control that drives them to do and believe in things that rational people normally wouldn’t. When Spinoza says “…can only trust to luck, wobbling miserably between hope and fear. That makes them ready to believe anything that will calm them down” (Treatise 2) he understands that what makes people believe irrational things is their need for hope and control. It is extremely comforting to ‘know’ that everything that happens, good or bad, is caused by God/s and that it is in response to something one did (i.e. prayer) that caused the good or bad to happen. Spinoza is not against religion. He just disagrees with the superstitions that are so often attached with much of religion. Even though he wrote about superstition a few hundred years ago, much of his arguments still have relevance today. People let their fears and insecurities get the best of them all the time and will believe anything – no matter how unreasonable – so long as it comforts them.

Spinoza thinks that “superstition-switching” causes many outbreaks of disorder and war (Treatise 3).  He thinks that it causes disorder and war because he believes that people are unhappy and are constantly looking for new superstitions that have not yet deceived them. This constant search for something different causes disorder and chaos as people get fed up with one superstition, start cursing it and try to find something new. It causes disorder because switching ends up upsetting the leaders or followers of their previous superstition who are desperate for power and control. Throughout the history of this world, there has been much pain caused in the name of superstitious ideas and the desperate need for power and control of people’s beliefs.

What is it that keeps some people so attracted to superstitions that even though they are deceived by them, they will either continue to believe in them or simply switch to belief in another irrational superstition. Obviously, fear and need for constant control is part of what drives them to continue to be deceived by irrationality and superstition. However, I think that there must be something more to it. There are many things that deceive people and even if that thing is driven by something as strong as a need for control and hope, if one is deceived by it enough times they will come to accept that it is not true. What is it that changes when the deceiving belief is superstition?

The Natural and the Artificial

    Things within the natural world are in a constant state of change, and through the changes made, whether out of necessity or chance, gain purpose and reveal their true nature. Aristotle thinks that while all things can have both stability and change, only a natural thing has the ability of these two qualities within itself, or without the help if an outside source (Physics 201). He understood and believed this through observation of action taking place, and came to the conclusion that change within subjects in the natural world can be divided into four main causes: Material Cause, Efficient Cause, Formal Cause, and the Final Cause (Physics 205).
    Something that is natural is created with the ability to change through time on its own, and originates with its nature intact. A substance that is created from an outside source and with a purpose in mind, whether out of necessity or not, is an artificial object (Physics 201). However, both artificial and natural objects have many causes for being, which help us to “find why something is so,” and which ultimately leads to knowledge and greater understanding of a substance and the world as a whole (Physics 205). In summary, there is the Material Cause, or the materials that make up a subject; the Formal Cause, or what gives form to an object; the Efficient Cause, or the motive for something being created; and the Final Cause, which is the purpose of a subject existing (Physics 205). So from the beginning, subjects within the world, whether natural or artificial, develop and go through phases, with an end purpose in mind. While only a natural object is capable of acting out its purpose within itself (Physics 201). It is this nature and purpose of an object that shapes or creates it’s form.
    The question then becomes, what exactly sets off these phases and the changes that lead to the nature and purpose of both natural and artificial objects being in existence? For instance, is it out of necessity that the changes take place, such as when a human needs shelter and builds an artificial object for that purpose (Physics 209)? Or perhaps it is out of chance and coincidence that the events take place, and thus cause and effect is enacted? However, it is most likely a combination of all factors, working together to set about events and the motions taking place. Thus, leading to the form of the natural world being brought about by the substances within it.

Causes, Luck and Chance

Causes, Luck and Chance

In “Physics, Book II,” Aristotle examines the nature of cause and effect. Aristotle argues that effects can be attributed to one of four causes: “material, formal, efficient and final.” The essential causes are causes which have a natural order. The “Material cause” includes the materials that something is going to be made from: i.e. we need stone and wood to build a house.  The “Formal cause” is, for example, the blueprints used to design a house. The “Efficient cause” is “the source of the primary origin of change or stability,” (Physics, 207) such as a carpenter making a product to create the final product, e.g., the house. The same thing may have more than one cause, but it’s “The final” cause that makes the big difference as it’s the purpose of result of all the other causes. Aristotle maintains that these four causes can be thought of as essential because they directly produce an effect.  Thus, any natural change must be the result of one or more of these four causes. After presenting his well developed thoughts on these four essential causes one might ask why Aristotle went further into other causes namely as accidental causes?

 Aristotle observes that some natural changes appear to be caused by accident. When this occurs, we attribute such coincidences to luck or chance. This presented a logical problem for Aristotle because he already argued that all natural changes are the result of his essential causes. Aristotle further notes that while past philosophers had even described events as caused by luck in their writings, they completely ignored this apparent cause in their formal analyses of cause and effect. Aristotle sought to address this contradiction.

To account for this apparent contradiction, Aristotle makes a clear distinction between essential causes and accidental causes. Essential causes have a direct impact on an outcome, but accidental causes can affect an outcome only indirectly through their effect on an essential cause. Aristotle provides a useful example to illustrate this subtle point. Suppose person A goes to the market for some unrelated reason with no awareness that person B, who owes A money, will be there. So A ends up in the same place as B purely by coincidence, which gives A the opportunity to collect the money from B. Thus, in this example, while it was clearly lucky that A ran into B, this coincidence could not have occurred if A had not decided to go to the market in the first place. So in this sense, while the outcome was largely a product of luck because A was not aware that B would be there, the “lucky” event could not have happened if A had not first chosen to go to the market.

 Aristotle goes even further by making a definite distinction between chance and luck. Even though they are similar “luck” is something that happens because of a purpose involved, whereas “chance” is something that happens by itself with no decision at all. Since, according to Aristotle, only adults are able to make conscious decisions, we can say that luck leads to coincidental outcomes for adults, but chance leads to coincidental outcomes for beasts, children and inanimate objects, as Aristotle argues “Chance on the other had belongs to other animals that man and to many inanimate object” (Physics, 210), because none of the latter categories are capable of conscious thought. If rock falls and hits a passerby, it did not make a conscious decision to do so therefore it is not luck.

        Aristotle elevates his four causes, such that luck and chance only comes after these causes. Aristotle shows us that neither luck nor chance exists without the other four causes. With difference between them being, that in thinking beings we call it luck; in non thinking beings we call it nature as chance is caused by nature.