The Fall, From King to Peasant

In the final chapter of Albert Camus' The Fall, Jean-Baptiste begins to narrate his life during World War II. He spoke very fondly of his career and how humbly he lived in Paris. He talked of his life lived in debauchery whilst in his crisis, and now he finds himself speaking about the remaining time in Amsterdam, or “the circles of hell”.

While Jean-Baptiste was captured and held captive by the Germans in Africa, he met a man by whom he referred to as Du Guesclin. Du Guesclin lost his faith in the Catholic Church, but still believed there should be a pope. Not the type of pope who prayed on the throne, but lived among the wretched (125). In order to find this new pope the man who was chosen had to be of the most failings (125). “As a joke, I raised my hand and was the only one to do so... the others agreed, in fun, but with a trace of seriousness all the same” (125). This reference reestablishes that even though Jean-Baptiste thought it might be a joke, it turns out his past really proves him to be the one with the most failings. His life's plan had all but failed therefore he should remain the pope.

In the next interesting piece of the final chapter, Jean-Baptiste declares to his guest that he has in his possession a famous fifteenth century painting known as The Just Judges. He goes about telling the man how he came into possession of it, and though he had not been the one to steal it, he still felt as if the blame should land on him. The Just Judges is his method of explaining how he is a “judge-penitent”. Jean-Baptiste's argument comes down to how there is a hope of finding freedom. A freedom that may be found only if one gives up oneself to something greater than their own (132). Jean-Baptiste believes that his work is to teach others such as his guest and those who come to Mexico City that their freedom would be reach if they met their unconditional guilt.

In the end, Jean-Baptiste wishes only to replay what has happened in the past (147). He would like for nothing more than to jump in after the girl knowing it would be too late. His ending has a unique exclamation; he feels as though being too late is fortunate. Perhaps he feels this way because his misery and suffering would not exist if he ceased to live. 

A Social Realization in a Philosophical Solipsism

The chapter begins as Jean-Baptiste wishes to speak further with the reader regarding his affairs in Amsterdam. The narrator recalls the beauty of his Greek vacation while sailing the foggy Zuiderzee. The sea represents a constitutive experience. The thick fog of the sea juxtaposed with an island vacation presents a stark contrast. He remembers men holding hands in public while women remained indoors. Such an open display of affection shifts his attention towards his experiences with women. Jean-Baptiste yearns to reenter such an existence but his experiences with men have remained professional. He then seeks refuge among women. One of these women whom he calls a “parrot” threatened to starve herself. He soon lost all passion for the music he once loved. He makes a vow of chastity.

Jean-Baptiste soon finds himself caught up in a debaucherous orgy. Once a forbidden fruit, sex becomes a hedonistic refuge. He is driven by an insatiable desire he believes will lead him towards true happiness. Jean-Baptiste enters a thirty year self-engagement following what seems to have been a perpetual failure. He writes “Alcohol and women provided me, I admit, the only solace of which I was worthy. I’ll reveal this secret to you, cher ami, don’t fear to make use of it. Then you’ll see that true debauchery is liberating because it creates no obligations. In it you possess only yourself; hence it remains the favorite pastime of the great lovers of their own person.” (103) Jean-Baptiste’s alter ego sees happiness as the road to freedom. Once his narcissistic personality clashes with that of his lover his happiness quickly turns into feelings of betrayal and jealousy. These moments of self-judgment and detachment have only led to months of hedonistic orgies. There is no redeemable end in sight. Jean-Baptiste turns his attention away from his failed love life.

Jean-Baptiste searches his own mind for anything that might have given him an existential experience. At work he is resigned to boring tasks. There is yet another incident when he was plagued with indecision. He remembers ignoring a black speck in the water during a trip. He wonders whether this resignation has withdrawn him into a period of confinement. It is a rather absurd notion to suggest a man who is not guilty is struggling between innocence and judgment. He believes one might compare this to being spit on the face in a medieval oubliette awaiting justice. This is an awfully strange comparison. Jean-Baptiste has a tendency to blame man for the sins of mankind simply because there is no clear distinction between guilt or innocence. It is a commonly held belief that divine power passes judgment. Therefore, by acting as a judge-penitent Jean-Baptiste has assumed the role of God.

Religion plays a critical role in the solipsistic philosophy of Jean-Baptiste. He is well-versed in scriptures. Jean-Baptiste draws parallels between the Slaughter of the Innocents and post-WWII sentiments. He believes the Synoptic Gospels clearly demonstrate the importance of self-judgment by using a first-hand account of the life of Christ. The Confession of Peter refers to an episode in the New Testament where Peter proclaims Jesus Christ the messiah and Son of God. The Fall is essentially a long confession in which Jean-Baptiste proclaims himself judge-penitent. He does not mention whether God is the one dictating his philosophy on life. Jean-Baptiste maintains the continuity of his existence relies on his ability to cope with such parallels. Which leads us to wonder: Does Jean-Baptiste take the role of judge-penitent because he would gain more freedom of thought or does he desire to detach himself from reality as he has in the past?

A Night On The Seine

In The Fall, Camus writes an important passage that takes place along the River Seine and though open to interpretation, needs further clarification. The passage in the novel highlights issues of morality, guilt, complicity, and a particular view of what it means to be human which are all major themes of the novel itself.

Jean-Baptiste, after leaving a mistress, walks home in the middle of a November night (The Fall 69). He steps onto the Pont Royal, making his way to the Left Bank and in the process he notices a youthful woman dressed in black leaning upon the bridge railings. He walks on past her and hears the sound of the woman falling into the river waters and screaming as she floats downstream. The sounds of the screaming girl resonate with him until all he hears is an “interminable” silence (70). Though he stops at the sounds he does not turn around and after the silence he states, 

           “I wanted to run…yet…didn’t. I told myself I had to be quick…(then) an irresistible weakness steal over me" (70).                   

After this he forgets what he thought next and makes his way home to Blvd St. Michel and informed no one of the incident (70).

Jean-Baptiste, our modern day John the Baptist, has a chance to literally save the woman from a possible drowning. Interpretively he has a chance to be her savior and bring her out of the waters that she was plunged into. But Jean-Baptiste does not budge a muscle, instead his struggle is one of the mind. He wants to run; yet it seems not to the girl but rather away, underscoring a sense of guilt and shame. He trembles and has the thought of what to do, of what would be morally “right” but then has perhaps a moment of akrasia.

Finally the “irresistible weakness” overtakes him, but why a weakness? If you did not have a moral sense of right would it still be considered a “weakness”? The fact that in the aftermath he decides not to look over the newspapers for a few days may be a clue to his lingering guilt over the incident. For although there is no law that says he must save her and though he did not kill or harm her, he did nothing either to help prevent it.

In one brief instant Jean-Baptiste considers the morality of the situation, he experiences guilt, and in his decision he displays a sense of complicity. He had a choice in the matter and displayed an array of self-interruption dealing with that choice.  In that very instant Jean-Baptiste Clamence defined what it is to be human.

Hurray for Funerals

            In Camus’ The Fall, Clamence believes that people are compelled to behave in certain ways to fill the void left by a lack of excitement; essentially as a response to boredom.  These behaviors may be expressed by crimes, or through abuses of others, or even in very benign acts, like death, which are no one’s fault, exactly.  However, we are all to blame somewhat for our ravenous need for such events to occur around us.  He says towards the end of the chapter: “Something must happen- and that explains most human commitments.  Something must happen, even loveless slavery, even war or death” (The Fall 37). 

            He goes on throughout his conversation with a fellow bar patron to discuss his profession as a judge-penitent.  He appears to have an almost fanatical need to help people that he satisfies professionally by assisting widows and orphans to receive proper care by law (17).  However, he also expresses a need to help the elderly or blind cross the street- among a multitude of other behaviors- that he seems to perform compulsively (21).  Clamence seems very confident in his good deeds for others, both professionally and recreationally.  He also repeatedly mentions how satisfied he feels having found such a fulfilling vocation, knowing that he is really changing people’s lives for the better, yet it seems that he spends every night in the bar where his story begins, describing gin as the only comfort he has in the dark city (12).  He looks to other people both as ants, which he can only look down on from above, and as silhouettes dreamily walking through life (14). He even describes his position in the justice system as one where he does not need to be punished or punish others, so he remains in a position of power, untouched (27).  He seems to want to believe he loves helping people as much as he claims, yet it may be just something to fill the void just like all other events in life.

            Clamence explains that after living a life where he is constantly stimulated, the only thing that can excite him anymore is death.  He believes that when being notified of an acquaintance’s death, although one is momentarily saddened, there is more of an excitement awakened in them.  This death, and the presence of a funeral create drama and a narrative in the monotony of their life.  There is somewhere to go, a prospect that is hardly ever ignored.  Even if the recently deceased was not important to them, they still must visit, to witness the event (34).

            He describes funerals and death as those things that satisfy people’s cravings; things which need to happen in life in order to keep people living, otherwise people need to create an event, be it war or slavery, or the beating of their spouse (37).  Why is it that a simple life cannot suffice in any culture in any time?  Clearly, the repetition of those three examples Clamence gives exist time and time again, so why is it that we must create excitement where boredom exists, even when it seems to perpetuate more pain?

Self-Interpreting Animals?

Charles Taylor defines man as a “self-interpreting animal”, a being who exists only in self-interpretation, who comes to know itself, bringing all of its knowledge to its self, meaning, humans are subjects of experience. What we learn or know of objects is because of our experience with it, and describe them as such, which he calls the subjective nature and or properties. He states to understand the term, self-interpreting animal, we must also look at it from another side, which “requires that we think of it objectively, that is, as an object among other objects” (Taylor, 46). The objects are separate from our conceptions of it, properties it has without our conceptions of it, and are not dependant upon things.

Taylor further distinguishes objects and subjects into primary and secondary qualities in which he associates primary qualities with objects that are extensions or substances that belong to the thing itself, but separate from our relationship to it. Secondary qualities, which are subjective, are things like colors or qualities that we use as a result of an encounter we had with it, and are only concerned with our experience with that particular object. The set qualities are what further help us to understand our memory of the object.

            He understands the counterargument to his claim of judgments about our experience to an object and therefore is unable to reduce judgments to what we perceive an object to be. There will be experiences that we cannot attribute to anything else, but only to our experience of the thing, in such a case when we are dealing with emotions and feelings. He speaks of a “nameless fear” and “unfocused anxiety” where there is no object of reference (48). It is not the matter of there not being an object to reference but rather that an object is not needed for the direct cause of the emotion. Also our experience with an object may not reciprocate a similar response the second or third time of being in contact with it. His example of the water that feels cold now may feel warm later (46).

            Everyone’s experience of an object will be different because different people see things certain ways, so is it safe to say that humans are self-interpreting when we view things as we know them for the moment and not for a lifetime? As time goes by so does our memory of an object until it is brought back and viewed again. 

Is Man Self-Interpreting?

        

Charles Taylor argues that man is a self-interpreting animal. In order to understand this, he states that we have look at it from two points of views, objectively and subjectively. The objective view is seen “as an object among other objects” and the subjective is describing their properties according to our experience of them (Humans, 46). He says that one who is independent of such experiences would not be able to grasp why our senses such as sight enables us to see things in color (46). This is because as human beings, we can see the properties of certain objects through our experience of them and through repetition. Taylor creates a fable, where humans communicates with gaseous clouds called Alpha Centaurans and that it is possible for us to come to agreement with them, but they lack what we have which we know as “sense organs” (46). 

         It is through our experience and the interpretation of ourselves that makes us who we are and therefore cannot be seen as just a view on reality. When we experience thing with emotions or with desire as Taylor calls “experienced motivation,” we make judgments about the objects they are directed towards (47). These emotions allow us to be aware of certain situations and it gives us a better understanding of it. He says “Describing properly what these emotions are like involves making explicit the sense of the situation… gives the emotion its character” (48). This helps us to understand the meaning of such emotions and their properties. 

         Taylor describes this as an “import” and that it is related to certain aspirations or feelings (48). An import can stimulate emotions like fear or shame. In some cases, one is able to recognize the judgment or “import ascriptions” that one makes on a certain situation, even if it doesn’t correspond with the import. He uses an example of feeling ashamed even when he thought that there was nothing to be ashamed of (50). The imports are dependent on experience, so this would be impossible for Alpha Centaurans to understand because they see us from an objective view point. Taylor then uses himself as an example and that his effeminate voice and hands lacks masculinity and lowers his dignity, since he aspires to be respected among other men (53). The meanings of such emotions are only taken into account by those who are affected by it most, whereas it wouldn’t make sense to those that aren’t. 

         In contrast he describes the properties of physically menacing and that they are independent from experience, so that any living animal that lacked sense would understand the meaning of it (54). The Alpha Centaurans wouldn’t get why humans feel shame or humiliation, but they would understand the meaning of something dangerous or menacing. 

The Distinction Between Impressions and Ideas

                Within “An Abstract of a Book Lately Published; Entituled, A Treatise of Human Nature” the author seeks to make clarifications concerning topics presented in David Hume’s aforementioned text. The initial statement he wishes to examine concerns the source of all our “ideas, or weak perceptions” (6).  Hume wishes to create this distinction between the different types of perceptions as he believes that other philosophers have failed to do so. To accomplish this task, a distinction between ideas and impressions is necessary. Hume claims that all ideas originate from our impressions; or feelings of emotion and passion or the interpretation of external objects through the senses (5). Therefore, these impressions which are based upon feelings are strong perceptions that form the building block of thought and experience. In comparison, ideas are merely copies of these impressions as a result of thinking. Ideas are then the weaker of the two concepts presented. He continues to say that these impressions inevitably precede all ideas within the mind as they are the stronger of the two concepts (7). For example, the idea of a book derives from our initial impression of the object. Therefore the idea of the book cannot exist without this first impression as it is simply a copy.

                The author continues to delve into Hume’s definition of impressions more thoroughly throughout the text. For example, he states that on the occasion an idea is called to mind but is shrouded in ambiguity; the impression may provide a “clear and precise” (6) explanation. So, if all ideas are based upon impression and those that are even culled from the imagination originate from the source; then all ideas are reducible to things we have perceived through direct experience (6). Even if the mind has conjured an image that appears abstract and difficult to understand, we may ultimately return to the impression for understanding. As the author of the abstract summarizes, “All our ideas…are derived from our impressions, and we can never think of anything we have not seen...” (5). These definitions further exemplify that impressions provide greater clarity and ideas can only be weaker copies of these impressions.

                The author clarifies Hume’s reasoning for introducing this differentiation and applies the concepts of impressions and ideas to philosophical terms. He states that when an idea is not attached to the term, then it begs the question of what impression the idea is based off of. If these connections cannot be made, the philosophical term is then deemed “insignificant” (6). Through this passage it is apparent that Hume believes that in order for philosophical words to carry weight, they must initially arise from these ideas or copies of impressions. This is integral since it seems that Hume would dismiss any philosophical debate that is not grounded in this concept.